<p dir="ltr" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 14pt;"><strong>Opposition: culture and practice</strong></span></p>
<p dir="ltr">Since the announcement of the election results until this writing, there has been talk about the importance of having an opposition within the parliament. Especially after the insistence shown by the Sadrist bloc in forming a government that it expressed as a national majority government. As it has become recognized, most or all of the new parties that won a number of seats, if we add to them a number of independents, will choose to go to the opposition. The expected total number of parliamentary opposition deputies is about (30-35). It is the backbone of a group of blocs: Al-Jeel Al-Jadeed-Ittihad-Ishraqa Canon, in addition to some independent MPs joining them. This small number of opposition representatives will not constitute a political force to rein in the traditional political blocs that are expected to participate in forming the government. If we take into account the two main challenges of the new opposition forces, namely: the weakness of the parliamentary experience of the new opposition forces, in contrast to the accumulated political and parliamentary experiences of the traditional parties on the one hand. On the other hand, the loss of a joint comprehensive vision and a comprehensive program puts all these small blocs under its umbrella. Certainly, this does not mean turning a blind eye to the possibility that the opposition - with regard to the role of its deputies as individuals - will play its legislative and oversight role in directing questions and inquiries and even questioning the executive authority, despite its limited influence.</p>
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<p dir="ltr">The effect of this is with no major coalition capable of threatening to impeach executive branch officials. The idea of the opposition's existence in the classical parliamentary systems lies in its ability to form a shadow government that works to bring down the existing government and presents itself as an alternative either during the parliamentary session or the elections that follow. All this on the assumption that there is a small opposition that does not exceed 10% of the number of parliament representatives. But in the event that the coordination framework or some of its blocs or other blocs of the Kurds and Sunnis turn to the opposition, it can be expected that they - that is, the opposition - may form a greater force that can coordinate with the opposition blocs that are less in number and experience in order to display their capabilities in front of the blocs that will form the government. It is an unlikely possibility so far!</p>
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<p dir="ltr">In the midst of the discussion about the effectiveness and importance of having a parliamentary opposition, there is talk about the theoretical and legal framework that will govern the governance equation between the two parties (loyalty-opposition) if efforts to form a government of broad political participation fail. In my opinion, one of the most important reasons for the stumbling blocks of our current political system is jumping with focus on (practice) and neglecting (culture) that would establish and facilitate the work of theoretical and legal frameworks. This is the reason for the delay in the movement of our political system and its ability to produce convincing and effective solutions in the lives of citizens. The discussion was about the constitution, elections and democracy at a time before realizing the importance of all these concepts by creating a culture for them in the social milieu. It is as if we put the horse behind the cart instead of in front of it. Despite the scope of optimism that many observers store in amending the tracks of parliamentary work, the biggest challenge facing the parliamentary opposition approach and its necessity in our (democratic) system is the weakness of the opposition culture in understanding and social behavior. This is due to the founding roots of the successive political systems. Especially that which followed the coup military regimes in 1958. The Iraqi social mind was built on the culture of one party, and that there was no room for differences of opinion. Indeed, dissenting in thought, orientation, and creed means departing from patriotism and loyalty to the party and the states. Therefore, the state and those concerned with its educational and cultural system must also pay attention to consolidating and accepting the culture of difference, opposition and objection, and even encouraging it, albeit through simulation. Thus, we raise a generation that realizes that the opposition is a pivotal part that guarantees the effectiveness and dynamism of the regime. And then the theoretical and legal frameworks will be a foregone conclusion and a natural result of the efforts of the builders and the social mind.</p>